Project 2025: The Department of Defense, Conclusion
Sometimes, when there’s breaking news or important topics which you need to cover, you need to step away from the series you’ve already started. And over the past two days, that’s precisely what I had to do when I covered some of the breaking news out of the Trump Administration. But today, I’m back to covering Project 2025’s Plans for the United States Military.
Part 1: The United States Special Operations Command
Commander: Gen. Bryan P. Fenton, Army
Deputy Commander: Lt. Gen. Sean M. Farrell, Air Force
Vice Commander: Lt. Gen. Francis L. Donovan, Marine Corps
Senior Enlisted Leader: Command Sgt. Maj. Shane W. Shorter, Army
The only unified command created by an Act of Congress, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM or Special Ops) is the unified combatant command (which is a joint military command of two or more service branches of the US Armed Forces) charged with overseeing the various special operations component commands of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force. Part of the Department of Defense, the Special Ops are headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. From this base, the special ops took part in the Invasion of Panama, the Gulf War, the Somali Civil War, the 1991 Haitian Coup, and the War on Terror in Afghanistan (2001-2021) and Iraq (2003-2011). Though, according to Project 2025, their operations as part of the United States’ conventional war in Afghanistan (which they state was a failure as a whole), were executed extremely effectively as part of the counterterrorism campaign against ISIS and Al-Qaeda.
Now, in the subsequent years since the Army ended it’s deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan; as well as due to the fact that there hasn’t been another major attack on the U.S. homeland since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, Project 2025 states that there is a movement to reduce the scope and scale of Special Op’s mission in favor of other service priorities in great-power competition. Though, the Project states that this would be a mistake due to the fact that the Special Ops can be employed effectively in great-power competition. Therefore, they state that:
It makes sense to capitalize on the experience of the Special Operations Command and repurpose its mission to include irregular warfare within the context of great-power competition, thereby providing a robust organization that is capable of achieving strategic effects that are critical to both our national defense and to the defense of our allies and partners around the globe. Irregular warfare should be used proactively to prevent state and nonstate actors from negatively affecting U.S. policies and objectives while simultaneously strengthening our regional partnerships. -pg. 121
To that end, Project 2025 states that, if the United States maintain irregular warfare’s traditional focus on nonstate actors, they limit themselves to addressing only the symptoms (nonstate actors), and not the problems themselves, which they state are countries such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Though, in my opinion, President Trump is not in a place to properly confront these leaders due to his affinity for strong-man leaders and dictators. In his previous administration, he was a fan of Kim-Jong Un, Putin, and Xi Jinping, the leaders of North Korea, Russia, and China respectively. Nevertheless, Project 2025 sets out a list of needed reforms they hope the Trump Administration makes to the Specials Ops.
Needed Reforms
Make Irregular Warfare a Cornerstone of Security Strategy
Project 2025 states that the United States can project strength through unified action with our interagency allies, and partners by utilizing irregular warfare capabilities synchronized with elements of national power. In order to do so, they state that the administration should redefine what this means, while also addressing current state and nonstate actors (such as ISIS) as they are critical to countering irregular threats that range from Chinese use of economic warfare to Russian disinformation and Islamist terrorism. If the National Security Strategy’s definition of irregular warfare were to be changed, Project 2025 states that this would provide resources and capabilities to counter threats and ultimately serve as credible deterrence at the strategic and tactical levels. Thereby, they call on the administration to:
Define irregular warfare as a means by which the United States uses all elements of national power to project influence abroad to counter state adversaries, defeat hostile nonstate actors, deter wider conflict, and maintain peace in great-power competition.
Characterize the state and nonstate irregular threats facing the United States by region in the National Security Strategy
Direct that irregular warfare resources, capabilities, and strategies be incorporated directly into the overall National Defense Strategy instead of being relegated to a supporting document; and
Establish an Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence to help the Department of Defense train, equip, and organize to conduct irregular warfare as a core competency across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict.
Counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Globally
The Belt and Road Initiative, also known as One Belt One Road in China and sometimes referred to as the New Silk Road, is a global infrastructure development strategy adopted by the government of China in 2013 to invest in more than 150 countries and international organizations. Composed of six urban development land corridors linked by road, rail, energy, and digital infrastructure; as well as the Maritime Silk Road, which is linked by the development port. A geopolitical and geoeconomic project, this initiative is a set of proposed overland routes for road and rail transportation through landlocked Central Asia along the fame historical trade routes of the Western Regions. Though, it should be noted that road actually refers to the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which are Indo-Pacific sea routes through Southeast Asia to South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Project 2025 states that the Department of Defense, in conjunction with other government agencies and international allies must work proactively to counter China’s BRI around the globe by:
Tasking the Special Operations Command and corresponding organizations in the Pentagon with conceptualizing, resourcing, and executing regionally based operations to counter the BRI with a focus on nations that are key to the United States’ energy policy, international supply chains, and the United States’ defense industrial base.
Using regional and global information operations to highlight Chinese violations of Exclusive Economic Zones, violations of human rights, and coercion along Chinese fault lines in Xinjiang Province, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in addition to China’s weaponization of sovereign debt.
Directly counter Chinese economic power with all elements of national power in North America, Central American, and the Caribbean to maintain maritime freedom of movement and protect the digital infrastructure of nations in the region.
Establish Credible Deterrence through Irregular Warfare to Protect the Homeland
Project 2025 states that a whole-of-government approach and willingness to employ cyber, information, and counterterrorist irregular warfare capabilities should be utilized to protect the homeland. This would be done by including the designation of Special Operations Command as lead for the execution of irregular warfare against hostile state and nonstate actors in the National Defense Strategy, demonstrate a willingness to employ offensive cyber capabilities against adversaries who conduct cyberattacks against U.S. infrastructure, businesses, personnel, and governments; employ a “name and shame” approach by making information regarding the names of entities that target democratic processes and international norms available in a transparent manner, work with the Interagency to employ economic warfare, lawfare, and diplomatic pressure against hostile state and nonstate actors; and maintain the authorities necessary for an aggressive counterterrorism posture against threats to the homeland.
Part 2: Nuclear Deterrence – The Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Drew Walter, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical & Biological Defense Programs
Maj. Gen. Lyle K. Drew, USAF, Acting Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Project 2025 states that Nuclear Deterrence is one of the most critical elements of U.S. national security because it forms a backstop to U.S. military forces. They state that every operational plan relies on the assumption that nuclear deterrence holds. As well, they note the fact that every administration since the U.S. first acquired nuclear weapons have pursued a strategy designed to deter nuclear and non-nuclear attack; assure allies; and, in the event of nuclear employment, restore deterrence at the lowest possible cost to the U.S. However, they state that the United States’ ability to meet these goals is increasingly challenged by the growing nuclear threats which are posed by their adversaries. Such examples they state include China pursuing a strategic breakout of its nuclear forces, Russia expanding its nuclear arsenal and using the threat of nuclear employment as a coercive tactic in its war on Ukraine, North Korea’s advancing its nuclear capabilities, while also stating that Iran is inching closer to nuclear capability.
Meanwhile, they state that all U.S. nuclear capabilities and the infrastructure on which they rely date from the cold war and are in dire need of replacement. Therefore, Project 2025 calls on the next Administration to focus on continuing the effort to modernize the nuclear triad while updating the United States’ strategy and capabilities to meet the challenges posed by a more threatening nuclear environment. In order to do so, Project 2025 calls for the following reforms to be implemented by the Trump Administration:
Needed Reforms
Prioritize Nuclear Modernization
Project state states that all components of the nuclear triad are far beyond their intended lifetimes, and therefore call for them to be replaced over the next decade. They state that this effort is required for the U.S. to maintain its nuclear triad – and will be the bare minimum needed to maintain U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence. Therefore, as part of the goal to prioritize nuclear modernization, Project 2025 states that the Trump Administration should:
Accelerate the timelines of critical modernization programs including the Sentinel missile, Long Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO), Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, B-21 bomber, and F-35 Dual Capable Aircraft.
Reject any congressional proposals that would further extend the service lives of U.S. capabilities such as the Minuteman III ICBM
Ensure sufficient funding for warhead life extension programs (LEP), including the B61-12, W87-1 Mod, and W88 Alt 370.
Develop the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear (SLCM-N).
In 2018, the first Trump Administration proposed restoring the SLCM-N to fill a growing gap in U.S. nonstrategic capabilities and improve deterrence against limited nuclear attack. However, the Biden Administration later cancelled this program in its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was the comprehensive assessment of the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2022. This review determined the specific nuclear weapons systems needed to support chosen strategy and outlines the overall nuclear posture of the United States. In the eyes of the authors of Project 2025, this was a mistake. Therefore, they call on the administration to support and accelerate funding for development of the SLCM-N with the goal of deployment by the end of the decade. That is, within 5 years time.
Account for China’s Nuclear Expansion
In order to ensure its ability to deter both Russia and the growing Chinese nuclear threat, Project 2025 states that the U.S. will need more than the bare minimum of nuclear modernization. Project 2025 states that this problem was described in President Biden’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review but proposed no recommendations to restore or maintain nuclear deterrence. Therefore, Project 2025 states that the Trump administration should:
Consider procuring more modernized nuclear systems (such as the Sentinel missile or LRSO) than currently planned.
Improve the ability of the U.S. to utilize the triad’s upload capacity in case of a crisis.
Review what capabilities in addition to the SLCM-N are needed to deter the unique Chinese threat. An example given would be non-strategic weapons or new warhead designs.
Restore the Nuclear Infrastructure
Project 2025 states that The United States must restore its necessary nuclear infrastructure so that it is capable of producing and maintaining nuclear weapons. Therefore, project 2025 calls on the Trump Administration to:
Accelerate the effort to restore plutonium pit production, which is essential for both modern warhead programs and for recapitalizing the stockpile.
Continue to invest in rebuilding infrastructure, including facilities at the National Laboratories that support nuclear weapons development.
Restore readiness to test nuclear weapons at the Nevada National Security Site to ensure the ability of the U.S. to respond quickly to asymmetric technology surprises.
Correctly Orient Arms Control
Project 2025 states that The United States should agree to arms control agreements only if they help to advance the interest of the United States and its allies. In doing so, they state that the Trump Administration should:
Reject proposals for nuclear disarmament that are contrary to the goal of bolstering deterrence.
Pursue arms control as a way to secure the national security interests of the U.S., and its allies rather than as an end in itself
Prepare to compete in order to secure U.S. interests should arms control efforts continue to fail.
Part 3: Missile Defense
Lt. Gen. Heath Collins, Director of the Missile Defense Agency
Laura M. DeSimone, Executive Director of the Missile Defense Agency
Project 2025 states that missile defense is a critical component of the U.S. national security architecture. They state that it can help to deter attack by instilling doubt that an attack will work as intended, take adversary “cheap shots” off the table, and limit the perceived value of missiles as tools of coercion. Project 2025 also claims that it also allows space for diplomacy during a crisis and can protect U.S. and allied forces, critical assets, and populations if deterrence fails. They also state that the adversaries of the United States are increasingly relying on missiles to achieve their aims. This include China and Russia, who are deploying new hypersonic glide vehicles and investing in new ground-launched, air-launched, and sea-launched cruise missiles which uniquely challenge the United States in different domains. Though, as previous stated above, those are not the only countries which the United States should be worried about. They also need to be worried about North Korea due to their proximity to allies such as South Korea and Japan, as well as Iran as it continues to maintain an arsenal that is capable of striking U.S. and allied assets in the middle east and Europe, and its rocket launches demonstrate that it either has or is development the ability to build Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).
Project 2025 states that missile defense has been underprioritized and underfunded in recent years. Therefore, in light of these growing threats, the Trump Administration should treat missile defense as a top priority.
Needed Reforms
Champion the Benefits of Missile Defense
Project 2025 states that despite its deterrence and damage-limitation benefits, opponents argue incorrectly that U.S. missile defense is destabilizing because it threatens Russian and Chinese second-strike capabilities. Therefore, they call on the administration to reject these claims (which they state are made by the left) and acknowledge that Russia and China are developing their own defense system. They also state that the new administration should commit to keeping homeland missile defense off the table in any arms control negotiations with Russia and China.
Strengthen Homeland Ballistic Missile Defense
Project 2025 states that the United States currently deploys 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) as part of its Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to defend the homeland against North Korea. Though, they claim that as North Korea improves its missile program, the system is at risk of falling behind. Therefore, they call on the administration to buy at least 64 of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), as it is more advanced than the GBI for an eventual uniform fleet of interceptions. (The Biden Administration previously had plans to buy 20). While, at the same time, they state that the administration should consider additional steps to strengthen the GMD system such as layered missile defense or a third interceptor site on the East Coast.
Increase the Deployment of Regional Missile Defense
Using the war in Ukraine as an example, Project 2025 explains that U.S. regional missile defense capabilities are very limited; therefore, the United States has been unable to supply their partners reliably with any capabilities, and the number and type of regional missile defense platforms are less than the U.S. needs for its own defense. Therefore, they call on the Administration to ensure that the United States prioritizes procurement of more regional defense systems such as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Standard Missile-3, and Patriot Missiles.
Change U.S. Missile Defense Policy
Project 2025 states that the United States has historically chosen to rely solely on deterrence to address the Russian and Chinese ballistic missile threat to the United States homeland and to use homeland missile defense only against rogue nations. Therefore, they call on the administration to abandon the existing policy of not defending the homeland and focus on how to improve defense as Russian and Chinese missile threats increase at an unprecedented rate; whilst, at the same time, they call on the administration to invest in future advanced missile defense technologies such as directed energy or space-based missile defenses that could defend against more numerous missile threats.
Invest in New Track-and-Intercept Capabilities
Project states that, with the advent of new hypersonic missiles and increased numbers of cruise missile arsenals by threat actors, there is a higher threat to the United States’ missile defense capabilities. Therefore, they call on the administration to invest in cruise missile defense of the homeland, accelerate the program to deploy space-based sensors that can detect and track missiles flying on non ballistic trajectories, and to accelerate the Glide Phase Interceptor, which is intended to counter hypersonic weapons.
And with that we conclude Project 2025’s plans for the Department of Defense. I hope that this series of posts are enlightening when it comes to what may happen to the United States armed forces should Project 2025 be implemented in it’s entirety, while also telling you precisely who is in charge of doing so. Next time in this series, I will start covering the Department of Homeland Security.